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TRADE SECRET CONFIDENTIALITY AND TOXIC
SUBSTANCES REGULATION: A NON-TARIFF
TRADE BARRIER IN THE CHEMICAL
TRADE
The United States and the European Economic Community
(EEC)' have enacted measures to control the use of hazardous chem-
ical substances.2 The United States passed the Toxic Substances
Control Act (TSCA) in 1976. 3 TSCA was the legislative response to
a governmental study conducted in 1970 on the dangers of toxic
chemicals.4 The EEC counterpart to TSCA, the Council of Euro-
pean Communities Directive on Classification, Packaging, and
Labelling of Dangerous Substances (Directive), was enacted in 1967
and substantially amended in 1979.5
Both measures require chemical manufacturers and importers
to submit extensive information about their chemical products to the
respective regulatory authority.6 Although both measures provide
for the confidential treatment of some of this data, their approaches
to confidentiality differ.7 For the most part, the Directive offers
greater protection against the disclosure of trade secrets than does
TSCA. Because of the greater possibility that the U.S. regulatory
authority will reveal a trade secret to competitors, a chemical manu-
facturer will, all other things equal, export his product to the EEC
rather than to the United States. In this way, the differences in the
confidentiality provisions of the two statutes create a non-tariff trade
1. The EEC member states are Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and West Germany.
2. For a discussion of potential chemical hazards, see Borasko, The Pesticide
Dilemma, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 145-83 (Feb. 1980); THE Toxic SUBSTANCES STRATEGY
COMM., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT I-1 to 1-9 (Aug. 1979) (public review draft).
3. Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629
(1976)).
4. COUNCIL ON ENVT'L QUALITY, Toxic SUBSTANCES (1971), reprintedin LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 757-88 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as LEGISLATIE HISTORY].
5. Directive 67/548/EEC, J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 196) 13 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as 1967 Directive], as amendedby Directive 79/831/EEC, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 259)
10 (1979) [hereinafter cited without cross reference as Directive]. All essential details of
the 1967 Directive were replaced by the 1979 amendments.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603-2607 (1976); Directive art. 6, Annex VII & VIII. For a discus-
sion of the data disclosure requirements, see notes 35-50, 69-78 infra and accompanying
text.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 2613 (1976); Directive art. 11. For a comparative analysis of the two
measures' approaches to confidentiality, see notes 79-151 infra and accompanying text.
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barrier in the EEC-United States chemical trade. The trade barrier
is the subject of this Note.
Sections I and II discuss the general approaches of TSCA and
the Directive toward toxic substance legislation, focusing especially
on their rules of confidentiality. Section III presents a comparative
analysis of the confidentiality provisions, thereby setting forth the
trade barrier problem. Finally, section IV suggests recommenda-
tions for reducing this trade barrier.
I
TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT
A. GENERAL APPROACH
Through TSCA, Congress hoped to effectively regulate toxic
substances without unduly burdening technological innovation.8
TSCA covers foreign importers as well as domestic manufacturers of
chemical substances.9 Congress charged the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) with responsibility for the administration of the
Act.10 TSCA places the burden to supply data regarding all manu-
factured chemical substances on the chemical industry.II EPA bases
its regulatory actions upon a consideration of this data.12
8. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b) (1976). For an extensive analysis of TSCA, see Druley &
Ordway, The Toxic Substances ControlAct, [1977] ENvm. RiEP. (BNA) (Monograph No.
24); Gaynor, The Toxic Substances ControlAct: A Regulatory Morass, 30 VAND. L. REV.
1149 (1977). See also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, note 4 supra.
9. All operative provisions of TSCA expressly apply to the "manufacture" of chem-
ical substances. TSCA defines the term "manufacture" to mean not only the production
of chemical substances, but also their importation into the United States. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2602(7) (1976). Furthermore, TSCA expressly provides that Treasury may disallow the
importation of chemical substances if the foreign manufacturer fails to comply with any
provision of the Act. Id § 2612(a).
The Act does not apply to chemical substances manufactured solely for export from
the United States as long as the manufacturer satisfies certain conditions. Id § 2611.
10. See id §§ 2601(c), 2602(1). Scattered sections of TSCA specifically empower
EPA to promulgate regulations. See, e.g., id §§ 2607(a)(1), 2613(a)(1). Pursuant to this
grant of power, EPA has issued regulations contained in scattered sections of 40 C.F.R.
(1980).
11. Id § 2601(b)(1). EPA may require the submission of reasonably ascertainable
data under many sections of the Act. See id §§ 2603-2607. This data may include, but is
not limited to, the following: (1) the trade name, chemical identity, and molecular sruc-
ture of the substance, id § 2607(a)(2)(A); (2) the proposed categories of use, id
§ 2607(a)(2)(B); (3) estimates of the amount to be manufactured and processed for partic-
ular uses, id § 2607(a)(2)(C); (4) description of byproducts resulting from manufactur-
ing, use, or disposal, id § 2607(a)(2)(D); (5) all existing data regarding the substance's
health and environmental effects, id § 2607(a)(2)(E); (6) the expected level of exposure to
human beings, id § 2607(a)(2)(F); and (7) the method of disposal, id § 2607(a)(2)(G).
12. In addition, EPA must base its regulatory actions upon a consideration of all the
anticipated environmental, economic, and social consequences of its action. Id
§ 2601(c).
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TSCA controls existing as well as new chemical substances.13
EPA is required to compile and keep current an inventory list of all
chemical substances manufactured in the United States.' Any sub-
stance not included in this inventory list is considered to be a "new
chemical substance,"' 15 and is subject to the premarket notification
requirement.16 The producer intending to manufacture a new chem-
ical substance must notify EPA at least 90 days prior to its manufac-
ture.' 7 Extensive data must accompany this notice, including the
chemical's identity, its proposed uses, the estimated production
quantities, and test data on environmental effects.' If, after a con-
sideration of this data, EPA finds that the substance creates an
unreasonable risk of harm, it may either prohibit 19 or regulate the
manufacture of that substance.20
If EPA finds that any new or existing chemical substance may
present an unreasonable risk of injury, and that insufficient data
exist from which the effects of that substance can be determined,
EPA must require the manufacturer to conduct tests to determine
those effects.2' If the tests indicate that production of the substance
creates an "unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environ-
ment,"22 TSCA allows EPA to invoke several remedies. 23 EPA may:
13. A "chemical substance" is a substance either created by a chemical reaction or in
elemental form. Id § 2602(2)(A). It does not include mixtures, controlled pesticides,
tobacco, nuclear material, special commercial items, or controlled food and drugs. Id
§ 2602(2)(B). A "mixture" is a combination of chemical substances that is not the prod-
uct of a chemical reaction. Id § 2602(8). In this Note, "chemical" and "substance" will
mean chemical substances or mixtures unless otherwise designated.
14. Id § 2607(b)(1).
15. Id § 2602(9).
16. Id § 2604(a)(1)(A). The premarket notification requirement also applies to the
processing of an existing chemical substance for a new use. Id § 2604(a)(1)(B).
17. Id § 2604(a)(1).
18. Id § 2604(d)(1), incorporating by reference id § 2607(a)(2). For a discussion of
the data requirements of section 2607(a)(2), see note II supra. In addition to the data
required by section 2607(a)(2), subsections 2604(d)(1)(B) and (C) set forth an additional
data submission requirement regarding the health and environmental effects of a new
chemical substance.
19. Id § 2604(b)(3).
20. EPA may regulate the manufacture of the substance by limiting the amount that
may be manufactured, id § 2604(b)(2)(A), or by taking any remedial measure prescribed
by sections 2605(a)(2)-2605(a)(7). Id § 2604(b)(2)(B), incorporating by reference id
§§ 2607(a)(2)-(7). For a listing of these measures, see notes 24-34 infra and accompany-
ing text.
21. Id § 2603(a). If testing would merely duplicate data already submitted or cur-
rently being developed, the manufacturer may be exempt from the testing requirement.
Id § 2603(c).
22. The applicable standard is "a reasonable basis to conclude that a chemical sub-
stance or mixture presents or will present a significant risk of serious or widespread harm
to human beings from cancer, gene mutation, or birth defects." Id § 2603(f).
23. Id Section 2603() incorporates by reference all remedies available under sec-
tions 2604-2606.
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(1) prohibit manufacture;2 4 (2) limit the amount manufactured; 25 (3)
prohibit a particular use;26 (4) limit the level of a particular use;27 (5)
require warnings to consumers and instructions for the substance's
use;28 (6) regulate commercial use;29 (7) regulate disposal;30 (8)
require notice of unreasonable risk and the institution of a repur-
chase procedure; 31 (9) obtain injunctive relief;32 or (10) any combi-
nation of the above.3 3 Finally, if a substance presents an "imminent
hazard," EPA may commence a civil action for seizure or other
relief.3
4
B. PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA
Often, the chemical producer must reveal trade secrets in order
to satisfy TSCA's information disclosure provisions. To relieve the
chemical producer's fear that EPA will reveal these trade secrets to
competitors, 35 Congress included provisions that protect the confi-
dentiality of certain information disclosed under the Act.36 Rather
than articulating a new rule for the confidential treatment of trade
secrets, Congress incorporated into TSCA the confidentiality stan-
dard enunciated in section 552(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA).37 Congress incorporated FOIA so that future disputes
arising under TSCA could be resolved by consulting the large body
of case law interpreting the FOIA confidentiality provisions.3 8
24. Id § 2605(a)(1)(A).
25. Id § 2605(a)(1)(B).
26. Id § 2605(a)(2)(A).
27. Id § 2605(a)(2)(B).
28. Id § 2605(a)(3).
29. Id § 2605(a)(5).
30. Id § 2605(a)(6).
31. Id § 2605(a)(7).
32. Id § 2604(f)(3)(A)(ii).
33. Id § 2605(a).
34. Id § 2606(a). Under certain circumstances, a private citizen may commence a
civil action to enforce the provisions of TSCA. Id § 2619.
35. For discussion of the chemical industry's fear that EPA will reveal trade secrets,
see Murray, Proposed Chemical Rules Dismay Industry, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING
NEws, March 19, 1979, at 21; CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEws, Sept. 5, 1977, at 17
("EPA Jolts Industry with Revised TSCA Rules"); CHEMICAL WEEKLY, Feb. 1, 1978, at
41 ("EPA Plans to Keep it Confidential").
36. 15 U.S.C. § 2613 (1976). In addition, EPA has promulgated regulations regard-
ing confidentiality. 40 C.F.R. §§ 2.306, 710.7 (1980).
37. 15 U.S.C. § 2613(a) (1976). The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1976), provides that any person may obtain access to the records of a federal agency
upon compliance with certain procedural formalities. FOIA, however, expressly exempts
certain records that are not to be disclosed to the public. Section 552(b)(4) is one of these
exemptions. For a discussion of the FOIA and its exemptions, see 12 R. MILGRIM, BUSI-
NESS ORGANIZATIONS-TRADE SECRETS 6.02A (1979).
38. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1341, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1976), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 4, at 457.
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Section 552(b)(4) provides that "trade secrets and commercial
or financial information" disclosed to federal agencies must be
accorded confidential treatment. 39 Although federal courts have
construed the meaning of the "trade secret" branch of the section
552(b)(4) exemption very narrowly,40 they have interpreted the
"commercial or financial information" branch very broadly.4 1 As a
general rule, any information "that would not ordinarily be dis-
closed to the public" qualifies for confidential treatment under this
provision.42 Even if a trade secret does not fit within the court's nar-
row interpretation of that term, it will fall within the broad interpre-
tation of commercial or financial information.4 3 Therefore, TSCA
protects the confidentiality of a trade secret unless that secret falls
within one of TSCA's specific exceptions to the FOIA confidentiality
rule.44
The manufacturer may designate the data that he believes is
entitled to confidential treatment and may submit that data sepa-
rately from the other information disclosed to EPA.45 Once desig-
nated as confidential by the manufacturer, EPA must notify the
manufacturer in writing of its intent to disclose such data, even if the
data does not qualify for confidential treatment under the FOIA
rule.46 EPA may not disclose the data until thirty days after the
manufacturer receives the notice.4 7 EPA, however, may disclose
39. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976).
40. Of the dozens of cases construing section 552(b)(4), only two have held informa-
tion exempt from FOIA as a trade secret. See 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 37,
6.02A(2)(c). For a collection of cases interpreting the FOIA exemption, see Annot., 21
A.L.R. Fed. 224 (1974).
41. See 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 37, 6.02A(2)(a)-(b).
42. Id
43. Id % 6.02A(2)(c).
44. TSCA provides several exceptions to the FOIA confidentiality rule. The data
may be disclosed to U.S. employees in connection with their official duties for purposes
of the protection of health or the environment, or for law enforcement. 15 U.S.C.
§ 2613(a)(1) (1976). Congress and U.S. contractors may also gain access to the informa-
tion. Id §§ 2613(a)(2), 2613(e). EPA may reveal health and safety data not related to
the manufacturing process, id § 2613(b), see note 103 infra and accompanying text, as
well as information "necessary to protect health or the environment against an unreason-
able risk of injury." Id § 2613(a)(3), see notes 94-96 infra and accompanying text. Fur-
thermore, EPA may disclose data relevant in a TSCA proceeding. Id § 2613(a)(4), see
notes 131-139 infra and accompanying text.
45. Id § 2613(c)(1).
46. Id § 2613(c)(2)(A).
47. Id There are several exceptions to this thirty day notice rule. If information is
given to U.S. employees, or revealed for law enforcement purposes, EPA is not required
to give any notice. Id § 2613(c)(2)(B)(i). If information is given to U.S. contractors, or
released in a TSCA proceeding under sections 2613(a)(2) or (4), EPA need only give five
days notice. 40 C.F.R. § 2.306(i)(2) (1980), incorporating by reference id § 2.301(g)(2).
Health and safety data releases are not noticed, 15 U.S.C. § 2613(c)(2)(B)(ii) (1976), but
any health and safety information relating to manufacturing processes must be noticed
under the general thirty day rule. Id If EPA finds that a substance creates an unreason-
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without notice any information not designated as confidential by the
manufacturer. 48 In addition, if EPA decides to disclose data that the
manufacturer believes to be protected by the Act, the manufacturer
may bring an action in federal court to restrain EPA from disclosing
the data.49 Finally, TSCA imposes strict criminal penalties on per-
sons who wrongfully disclose confidential data.
50
II
EEC COUNCIL DIRECTIVE
A. GENERAL APPROACH
The Council of the European Communities promulgated the
Directive on Classification, Packaging, and Labelling of Dangerous
Substances on September 18, 1979.-5 The 1979 Directive constitutes
the Sixth Amendment to the original 1967 Directive of the same title,
which outlined in general terms the Council's strategy with regard to
toxic substance control.52 The Council issued the Directive under
the Treaty of Rome, and in particular under Article 100, which calls
for "approximation" of the laws of the member states in order to
remove obstacles to the establishment of a Common Market.5 3
Though a directive is "an essentially incomplete and indeterminate
able risk of injury to health or the environment, it must provide at least fifteen days
written notice before disclosure. Id § 2613(c)(2)(B)(i). When an "imminent, unreasona-
ble risk of injury" exists, however, the manufacturer can receive as little as twenty-four
hours oral notice. Id In such a case, an exporter may find out by a mere phone call that
one of his major trade secrets will be disclosed the next day. 40 C.F.R. § 2.306(k)(4)
(1980).
48. 15 U.S.C. § 2613(c)(2)(A) (1976).
49. Id § 2619(a). This injunction, however, may be of little utility to the manufac-
turer if EPA is disclosing the data under the unreasonable risk exception, see note 47
supra and accompanying text, because of the short applicable notice period. Id
§ 2613(c)(2)(B)(i).
50. Any U.S. employee who, by virtue of his office, learns of confidential information
and knowingly discloses such information, is guilty of a misdemeanor and may be fined
up to $5,000, imprisoned for up to one year, or both. Id § 2613(d). See note 107 infra.
51. See note 5 supra. For a discussion of the Directive as it relates to TSCA, see
Note, Control of Toxic Substances: The Attempt to Harmonize the Not!ifcation Require-
ments of the U.S. Toxic Substances Control Act and the European Community Sixth
Amendment, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 417 (1980).
52. See note 5 supra.
53. The Treaty of Rome provides that "[t]he Council shall ... issue directives for
the approximation of such provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative
action in Member States as directly affect the establishment. . . of the Common Mar-
ket." Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 100 Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 (inforce Jan. 1, 1958) [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome]. An authori-
tative English translation appears in [1973] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, Part II (Cmd. 5179 II), at
1. One of the primary purposes of Article 100 is to permit removal of non-tariff trade
barriers. See 3 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 467-68
(1976).
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act,"' 54 it is immediately binding on Member States as to the result to
be achieved.55 Moreover, the European Court of Justice has held
that directives have direct legal effect, even in the absence of formal
domestic implementation.5 6
Two of the purposes of the Directive are protection of man and
the environment from dangerous substances and reduction of intra-
community barriers to the chemical trade.57 Notification,5 8 label-
ling, and packaging regulations are the means of controlling "sub-
stances" as defined in the Directive.5 9 The notification procedure for
newly marketed substances60 requires premarket submission to the
competent authority of a defined base set of information.61 The
competent authority initially determines whether the submitted
54. R. LAUWAARS, LAWFULNESS AND LEGAL FORCE OF COMMUNITY DECISIONS 28
(1973).
55. See 3 H. SMIT & P. HERZOG, supra note 53, at 467. Article 189 of the Treaty of
Rome provides that "[a] directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon
each Member State to which it is addressed," while leaving to national authorities the
choice of form and methods. Treaty of Rome, supra note 53, art. 189.
56. In Public Prosecutor v. Ratti, [1979] E. COMM. CT. J. REP. 1629, [1978-1979]
COMMON MKT. REP. (Court Decisions) (CCH) 8266, [hereinafter cited as Court Deci-
sions], the European Court of Justice interpreted the 1967 Directive, note 5 supra, prior
to the promulgation of the Directive. The court stated:
[A]fter the expiration of the period fixed for the implementation of a directive a
Member State may not apply its internal law-even if it is provided with penal
sanctions-which has not yet been adapted in compliance with the directive, to a
person who has complied with the requirements of the directive.
[1979] E. COMM. CT. J. REP. at 1642, Court Decisions, supra, at 8274. One commenta-
tor has noted:
It is the function of a directive to bring about, where this is necessary for the
realization of the objectives of the Community, an adaptation of the national law
of Member States. A directive may thus affect the national law of all Member
States, as is the case, for instance, with the directives given by virtue of Article
100 ....
R. LAUWAARS, supra note 54, at 28 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
At least one Member State, Germany, has promulgated domestic legislation pursuant
to the Directive. The German law in question should become effective in 1982. See
[1980] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 40,070.
57. Directive Preamble.
58. "[N]otification means the documents whereby the manufacturer or any other
person established in the Community who places a substance on its own or in a prepara-
tion on the market presents the requisite information to the competent authority of a
Member State." Directive art. 2(l)(d). Article 6 outlines the required contents of a "noti-
fication." See note 82 infra.
59. See id art. 5. The Directive provides that "'substances' means chemical ele-
ments and their compounds as they occur in the natural state or as produced by industry,
including any additives required for the purpose of placing them on the market." Id art.
2(l)(a). The packaging provisions require safely designed and properly constructed con-
tainers for substances placed on the market. Id art. 15. "'[P]lacing on the market'
means supplying or making available to third parties." Id art. 2(l)(e).
60. Article 13 requires the Commission to keep a list of all substances notified under
the Directive. Id art. 13(2). If a substance is not on this list, it is considered a newly
marketed substance.
61. For a discussion of the information to be included in this base set, see note 82
infra.
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information satisfies the base set data requirements. 62 It may then
request further information, conduct necessary sampling, or take
other measures "[i]f it can be shown necessary for the evaluation of
the hazard. ' 63 The competent authority must then transmit the noti-
fication dossier or a summary thereof to the Commission which, in
turn, transmits the information to the competent authorities of all
Member States.64
In the event of a disagreement between the manufacturer and a
competent authority, or between two competent authorities, the par-
ties may resort to the review procedures outlined in article 21.65
Substances posing "a hazard for man or the environment" may be
provisionally prohibited under certain circumstances. 66 Like TSCA,
the Directive procedures apply to importers as well as to domestic
manufacturers of chemical substances.67 Member States are to adopt
domestic legislative and administrative methods to effectuate the
Directive's purposes. 68
B. CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS
The Directive requires that secrecy be maintained for "confi-
dential information. ' 69 Although the Directive does not expressly
define "confidential information," article 11(1) requires that a "noti-
fier"70 regard such information as (1) that which is commercially
sensitive, (2) the "disclosure of which might harm [the notifier]
industrially or commercially," and (3) which the notifier "wishes to
be kept secret." 7' A special provision requires that "Member States
and the Commission shall ensure that any information concerning
commercial exploitation or manufacturing be kept secret."'72 The
latter provision appears to protect all trade secrets. 73
The Directive exempts certain information from confidentiality
protection.74 Information not protected includes, inter alia, the sub-
62. Id art. 7(l).
63. Id
64. Id arts. 9, 10.
65. Id arts. 7(2), 10(2), 21.
66. Id art. 23(1).
67. Id art. 2(1)(e).
68. Id art. 1. See notes 54-56 supra and accompanying text.
69. Id art. 11(4).
70. A "notifier" is a person who makes a notification. Id art. 2(l)(d).
71. Id art. 11(1).
72. Id art. 7(3) (emphasis added).
73. One commentator has noted that neither the Treaty of Rome, nor the pronounce-
ments of the Court, the Commission, or the Council has defined "trade secrets." See 4 A.
WisE, TRADE SECRETS AND KNoW-How THROUGHOUT THE WORLD § 7.021] (1974 &
1980 Supp.).
74. Directive art. 11(1).
TOXIC SUBSTANCES REGULATION
stance's trade name, "possible ways of rendering the substance
harmless," and other indications necessary to the safety of consum-
ers.75 More importantly, the Directive does not require that Member
States divulge information merely because the Directive accords that
information more protection than does domestic implementing legis-
lation.76 Responsibility for maintaining data secrecy rests with the
Member States and the Commission.77 In most cases, therefore, the
regulating body of the Member State in question will decide whether
submitted data satisfies the confidentiality tests.78
III
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CONFIDENTIALITY
PROVISIONS OF TSCA AND THE DIRECTIVE:
THE CREATION OF A NON-TARIFF
TRADE BARRIER
Governments, through legislation or administrative regulation,
often interfere with free trade, thereby creating trade barriers. 79
Although the tariff is the most common form of trade barrier, gov-
ernments also create significant non-tariff trade barriers through the
use of import quotas, import deposits, limits on import licenses, and
other stringent regulatory systems. 80
Trade barriers operate as a disincentive to exportation in two
ways. First, the barrier may increase the imported product's cost
and, consequently, its selling price. If that increase makes his price
higher than the price at which domestic producers sell the same
product, the foreign producer will not be able to sell the product in
the importing country, and hence, will not export it. Second, the
barrier may create risks for the foreign producer that are too great
relative to the potential benefits of exportation.
A comparison of the confidentiality provisions of TSCA with
those of the Directive indicates that the Directive offers the chemical
manufacturer greater protection against disclosure than does TSCA.
In effect, the differences in the confidential treatment available under
the two statutes operate as a non-tariff trade barrier. The foreign
75. Id
76. Id art. 11(4).
77. Article 11(4) provides: "[The confidentiality provisions] shall not oblige a Mem-
ber State whose legislation or administrative practices impose stricter limits for the pro-
tection of industrial and commercial secrecy than those laid down in these Articles to
supply information, where the State concerned does not take steps to comply with these
stricter limits." Id art. 11(4).
78. Id art. 11(2).
79. For a general discussion of trade barriers, see J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND
THE LAw OF GATT (1969).
80. See generally id
1981]
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chemical manufacturer's apprehension that EPA will reveal confi-
dential information submitted to comply with TSCA data require-
ments discourages those producers from exporting to the United
States.8 ' The following comparative analysis sets forth the differ-
ences between the confidentiality provisions of TSCA and the Direc-
tive that create this non-tariff trade barrier.
A. COSTS OF COMPLIANCE
Both the Directive and TSCA require the submission of exten-
sive data to the respective regulatory authority. The Directive
requires manufacturers to develop and submit a broad, well-defined
base set of information on the substance.8 2 By consulting the Direc-
tive, the manufacturer knows precisely what information it must
submit. Therefore, it can determine the cost of compliance with the
Directive before taking any action with respect to the submission of
data or the manufacture of the substance. In addition, the manufac-
turer knows precisely which trade secrets will be exposed to possible
disclosure.
On the other hand, the range of information required to be sub-
mitted under TSCA is vague and poorly defined.8 3 Rather than
requiring submission of itemized types of data, the TSCA data
requirement is couched in terms of general categories of informa-
tion, leaving the manufacturer with little guidance as to what EPA
may eventually require it to disclose.8 4 Consequently, the manufac-
81. See Murray, supra note 35, at 21; CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, Sept. 5,
1977, at 17 ("EPA Jolts Industry with Revised TSCA Rules"); CHEMICAL WEEK, Feb. 1,
1978, at 41 ("EPA Plans to Keep it Confidential").
82. Article 6 sets forth the Directive's base set data provision by precisely itemizing
the types of data required. The manufacturer must declare the potential unfavorable
effects of the substance, propose a classification and labelling scheme, recommend pre-
cautions for safe use of the substance, give notice of production quantity changes, submit
new knowledge of the effects of an existing substance, inform the agency of new uses for
existing substances, and describe any change in the properties of a notified substance.
Directive art. 6. In addition, article 6 expressly incorporates the data requirements set
forth in Annexes VII and VIII to the Directive. Both Annexes precisely itemize the data
required. This data consists of the chemical name, trade name, chemical formula, com-
position, methods of detection, proposed uses, production estimate, recommended pre-
cautions on handling and storage, potential dangers, recommended procedures if a spill
or personal injury occurs, physico-chemical data, toxicity, ecotoxicity, and methods for
rendering the substance harmless in industrial and public settings. Directive Annexes
VII & VIII.
83. TSCA's data submission requirements are scattered in various sections of the
Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2603-2607 (1976).
84. Some of the required data is precisely itemized. See note 11 upra. For the most
part, however, the requirements are set forth in general language. For example, TSCA
requires the submission of information regarding health and environmental effects to the
extent necessary for EPA to ascertain whether the substance poses an unreasonable risk
of harm. Id § 2603(a). Although section 2603(b) suggests what this information should
include, these suggestions are merely in the form of guidelines, not requirementws such as
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turer must always face the risk that, after incurring substantial test-
ing costs, EPA will require more testing, thereby necessitating the
incurrence of even greater costs. If the incurrence of these greater
costs will make exporting to the United States economically
unsound, the manufacturer may decide to withdraw the product
from the U.S. market. Unfortunately, the manufacturer will not be
able to recover the compliance costs already incurred. Furthermore,
this uncertainty makes it impossible for the manufacturer to know
precisely which trade secrets may be exposed to possible disclosure.
B. INFORMATION COVERED BY CONFIDENTIALITY PROVISIONS
The Directive extends confidential treatment to more types of
information than does TSCA. The chemical identity of a substance,
often a trade secret, is expressly protected by both statutes. The
Directive permits the manufacturer to encode the name of the chem-
ical substance,85 while the TSCA regulations allow the manufacturer
to use a generic name.86
The statutes differ, however, in the availability of confidential
treatment to non-chemical identity information. The Directive safe-
guards all non-chemical identity information that satisfies its general
rule of confidentiality.87 In other words, if the manufacturer desires
to keep the data secret, regards the data as commercially sensitive,
those set forth in the Annexes to the Directive. Furthermore, the manufacturer has no
means of knowing whether a given amount of information is enough to support an EPA
conclusion with respect to whether an unreasonable risk exists. The EPA may at any
point determine the manufacturer has not submitted sufficient health and environmental
data to support a conclusion.
85. Directive art. 11(3). The name of the substance is encoded on the list of notified
substances maintained by the Commission. See note 60 supra. If the substance is classi-
fied as "dangerous" within the meaning of article 2, however, encoding is not permitted.
For a discussion of the implications of this exception to the encoding rule, see notes 97-
105 infra and accompanying text. For a comparison of the degree of protection accorded
the chemical identity by both statutes, see note 86 infra.
86. 40 C.F.R. § 710.7()(1) (1980). The generic name is published in an appendix to
the inventory list maintained by EPA. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. The
Directive's encoding provision is more restrictive than the TSCA regulations' generic
name provision. Under TSCA regulations, any chemical may use a generic name as long
as the name is "only as generic as necessary." Id § 710.7(e)(2)(ii) (1980). The Directive,
however, restricts the use of encoding to non-dangerous substances. See note 85 supra
and accompanying text. This "dangerous" exception is quite broad, excluding many
chemicals from possible encoding. Furthermore, the EEC will encode the name only if
the competent authority so agrees. Directive art. 11(3). On the other hand, EPA pro-
vides a generic name whenever one is desired. 40 C.F.R. § 710.7(e)(1) (1980). Conse-
quently, if keeping the chemical identity secret is the manufacturer's only concern, the
Directive creates a greater trade impediment to it than does TSCA.
87. Directive art. I(1). This general rule is set forth in notes 69-72 supra and accom-
panying text. Any information that satisfies this test and does not fall within the list of
items expressly denied confidentiality must be kept secret by the Commission. Directive
art. 11(4).
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and fears that disclosure might result in commercial harm, the
Directive mandates confidential treatment.88 Furthermore, if the
data concerns the process used in the manufacturing of the sub-
stance, the Directive expressly protects it.89 TSCA, on the other
hand, does not expressly protect manufacturing data.90 This data,
like any non-chemical identification information, must satisfy the
FOIA test in order to merit confidential treatment.91 Although man-
ufacturing data will satisfy this test in most cases, the manufacturer
must risk the possibility that it will not.
TSCA's general confidentiality rule is subject to several excep-
tions.92 Therefore, satisfaction of the FOIA test does not necessarily
guarantee confidentiality. If information falls within the ambit of
one of the exceptions, it will not receive confidential treatment even
if the information consists of "trade secrets and confidential or
financial information." 93 The most important exception provides
that data "shall be disclosed if the Administrator determines it nec-
essary to protect health or the environment against an unreasonable
risk of injury to health or the environment. ' 94 This unreasonable
risk standard can be easily satisfied by EPA.95 When EPA finds an
unreasonable risk and gives proper notice to the manufacturer, it
may reveal the trade secret.96
The Directive includes a comparable exception to its confidenti-
ality rule. Article 11(3) provides that if a substance is classified as
"dangerous," the manufacturer will not be allowed to encode the
substance's name.97 In this way, one of the manufacturer's most
important trade secrets-the chemical identity of the substance-will
be revealed.
The absence of case law interpreting the TSCA exception makes
it impossible to compare the Directive's "dangerous" standard with
TSCA's "unreasonable risk" standard to determine which standard
88. Id art. 11(1).
89. Id art. 7(3).
90. Although TSCA exempts manufacturing data from the mandatory disclosure of
health and safety studies requirement, see note 103 infra and accompanying text, such
exemption does not require the confidential treatment of manufacturing data.
9 1. See notes 37-44 supra and accompanying text.
92. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2613(a)(1)-(4), 2613(b) (1976). These exceptions are discussed in
note 44 supra.
93. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976). See notes 37-44 supra and accompanying text.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 2613(a)(3) (1976).
95. See Gaynor, supra note 8, at 1152-55.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 2613(c)(2) (1976). For a discussion of TSCA's notice provisions, see
note 47 supra and accompanying text.
97. Directive art. 11(3). See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text.
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is harder for the relevant authority to satisfy.98 Therefore, any con-
clusion as to which standard, by itself, offers the manufacturer
greater protection against disclosure is speculative. Nevertheless,
two factors indicate that the manufacturer faces greater risk under
the TSCA exception than under the Directive exception. First, a
finding that a substance is dangerous under the Directive merely pre-
vents the manufacturer from disguising the chemical identity of that
substance.99 Such a finding does not mandate the disclosure of sen-
sitive non-chemical identity information. On the other hand, a
finding of unreasonable risk under TSCA requires the disclosure of
any information EPA deems necessary to protect health or the envi-
ronment from the unreasonable risk.10°
Second, article 2(2) of the Directive precisely defines the charac-
teristics of a substance that make it "dangerous" within the meaning
of the statute. 10 Consequently, before the manufacturer discloses
any data to the EEC, it will know whether the exception will apply.
If the harmful economic consequences of disclosure will exceed the
potential for profits, the manufacturer can decide to refrain from
exporting to the EEC before it incurs the costs involved in complying
with the Directive. On the other hand, TSCA provides no guidance
as to the meaning of "unreasonable risk." Therefore, the manufac-
turer faces the risk of incurring substantial compliance costs before
EPA determines that it must disclose confidential information
because the substance poses an unreasonable risk.
Finally, the differences in the confidential treatment accorded
health and safety studies create another problem for the potential
exporter to the United States. TSCA requires all chemical manufac-
turers to reveal to EPA "[a]ll existing data concerning the environ-
mental or health effects of [a] substance or mixture."' 0 2 TSCA then
provides that EPA may disclose any of this data that does not pertain
to "processes used in the manufacturing or processing of a chemical
substance."10 3 The Directive requires the manufacturer to submit all
98. No judicial interpretation of the Directive's "dangerous" standard would-be nec-
essary to make such a comparison because this standard is statutorily defined. See note
101 infra and accompanying text.
99. See notes 85, 97 supra and accompanying text.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 2613(a)(3) (1976).
101. A substance is "dangerous" if it is explosive, oxidizing, extremely flammable,
highly flammable, flammable, very toxic, toxic, harmful, corrosive, irritating, dangerous
for the environment, carcinogenic, teratogenic, or mutagenic. Directive art. 2(2). Article
2 precisely defines each of these characteristics.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a)(2)(E) (1976).
103. Id § 2613(b). Manufacturing data, however, must still meet the FOIA confiden-
tiality test before it merits confidential treatment. See notes 90-91 supra and accompany-
ing text. Furthermore, confidentiality will not be accorded manufacturing data if it fits
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data obtained through toxicological and ecotoxicological studies.04
The Directive, however, only permits the disclosure of the manufac-
turer's interpretation of this data. 05 All underlying data generated
by a health and safety study clearly consists of more information
than does the mere interpretation of such a study. Therefore, the
Directive protects more data generated through health and safety
studies than does TSCA.
C. AccEss TO CONFIDENTIAL DATA
A primary concern of the potential exporter is who will have
access to confidential data submitted to the regulating body. The
greater the number of persons with access to confidential informa-
tion, the greater is the likelihood that a damaging disclosure of such
information will occur. If a large enough number of people will
have access to the information in a given country, a chemical produ-
cer may be reluctant or unwilling to export to that country. Hence,
permitting broad access to confidential information may aggravate
the non-tariff trade barrier.'° 6 The availability of criminal sanctions
against governmental officials who wrongfully divulge confidential
data may deter disclosure, but such sanctions offer little solace to the
manufacturer who has just lost a trade secret worth millions. 07
One of the four groups given access to the Directive's confiden-
tial data is the competent authority of the country of manufacture. 0 8
The competent authority, appointed by the Member State, 0 9 exam-
ines data to ensure it conforms with the Directive and takes appro-
priate action if a potential hazard is found." 0 The competent
within the unreasonable risk exception, see notes 93-96 supra and accompanying text, or
any of the other exceptions to the FOIA rule, see note 44 supra and accompanying text.
104. Directive Annexes VII & VIII.
105. Id art. 11(1).
106. See notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text.
107. Criminal sanctions are desirable from the exporter's standpoint to deter damag-
ing disclosures. The Directive does not provide for such sanctions, but its silence in this
regard may indicate that Member States themselves bear the responsibility for providing
criminal penalties. Cf. Directive art. 7(3) ("Member States and the Commission shall
ensure that any information concerning commercial exploration or manufacturing is kept
secret"). TSCA, however, provides criminal penalties for employees of the United States
or agency contractors who wrongfully disclose confidential information. The elements of
the crime are: (1) a person who is an employee of the United States or of an agency
contractor, (2) having access to data because of his employment, (3) and who knows
disclosure is prohibited, (4) willfully discloses such data (5) to a person not entitled to
receive it. See 15 U.S.C. § 2613(d) (1976). Penalties upon conviction include fines up to
$5,000, imprisonment for up to one year, or both. Id § 2613(d)(1).
108. See Directive art. 6(l).
109. Id art. 7(1).
110. The competent authority may ask for more information, order special tests,
"carry out sampling," or take other "appropriate measures." Id
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authority sends the data to the Commission,"' which, in turn, trans-
mits the information to the other Member States' competent authori-
ties.112 If made necessary because of legal proceedings involving
controlled substances, the Commission or competent authority may
reveal secret information "to persons directly involved in such pro-
ceedings."113 Member States have a duty to ensure that all parties
receiving the information preserve its confidentiality." 4 The poten-
tial exporter generally knows its data will be in the hands of the
Commission and ten competent authorities. The safety of the data
will depend only on the discretion the Member States use in
appointing the competent authorities." 5
Unlike the Directive, TSCA and EPA regulations allow a
potentially large number of persons access to confidential informa-
tion. Within EPA, the regulations call for disclosure to any "office,
officer, or employee with an official need for the information."' 1 6
Furthermore, contractors working for EPA can obtain the informa-
tion under certain circumstances.' 17 The distinct possibility that an
exporter's competition will one day be an EPA contractor may be a
factor in the decision whether to export to the United States." 8
Any non-EPA employee of the United States who needs confi-
dential data in the course of his official duties protecting health or
the environment or for specific law enforcement reasons shall have
access to the information." 9 Furthermore, any congressional com-
11. Id art. 9.
112. Id art. 10(1). The competent authority of one Member State may ask the Com-
mission for further details about or tests conducted on the substance. If the second com-
petent authority refuses to comply with such a request, the Commission is to resolve the
dispute by making a decision pursuant to Article 21. Id art. 10(2).
113. Id art. 11(4).
114. Id art. 7(3). This provision apparently requires each Member State to take steps,
such as the imposition of criminal sanctions for unlawful disclosure, to maintain confi-
dentiality of commercial and industrial secrets. See note 107 supra and accompanying
text.
115. The precise number of persons with access will depend on the particular size of
the competent authority appointed. The Directive does not specify how large the author-
ity should be, but administrative costs impose a practical ceiling on the number of mem-
bers a given competent authority will have.
116. 40 C.F.R. § 2.306(h) (1980), incorporating by reference id § 2.209(e).
117. 15 U.S.C. § 2613(a)(2) (1976). Such disclosure must be "necessary for the satis-
factory performance by the contractor of a contract with the United States." Id The
provision applies to contracts "entered into on or after the date of enactment" of TSCA.
Id
118. Such an event could occur if EPA contracted with a competitor to verify test
results or even if the contractor merely expanded its operations after it had completed the
EPA contract. The exporter is protected by the contract and remedy rules of 40 C.F.R.
§ 2.306(j) (1980), incorporating by reference id § 2.301(h)(2)(ii). These protections, how-
ever, may be of little consolation once the secret has been lost. See 15 U.S.C. § 2626(a)
(1976).
119. Id § 2613(a)(1). For special administrative regulations governing interagency
disclosure, see 40 C.F.R. § 2.306(h) (1980), incorporating by reference id. § 2.209(c).
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mittee has a statutory right to any data EPA obtains under TSCA. 1
20
As under the Directive, TSCA data may be disclosed when relevant
to proceedings under the Act. 121 EPA may disclose confidential
information if the submitter consents. 122 When an exporter desires a
generic name for his substance he must consent to disclosure to a
bonafide manufacturer. 123 Finally, pursuant to a memorandum of
understanding between EPA and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, 24 OSHA may gain access to certain confi-
dential data submitted under TSCA. 1
25
Given the numerous and varied groups with potential access to
confidential information submitted under TSCA, a chemical
exporter to the United States could reasonably doubt the safety of its
trade secrets. Even when data is initially protected under TSCA and
limited to the parties specified by TSCA, the information can none-
theless be revealed later, if some other regulatory rule gives the pub-
lic a greater right to access than do the TSCA rules and
regulations. 26 A potential exporter, therefore, would be quite justi-
fied in concluding that information submitted stands a significant
possibility of eventual disclosure.
D. THE PROCEEDINGS EXCEPTION
Both TSCA and the Directive permit revelation of confidential
data in certain legal and administrative proceedings. The Directive
allows disclosure when the proceeding "involv[es] sanctions . ..
[and is] undertaken for the purpose of controlling substances placed
on the market."' 127 A person in any proceeding that does not involve
sanctions or does not concern control of "substances placed on the
market" will not have access to confidential information. 28 These
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 2613(e) (1976).
121. Id § 2613(a)(4). See notes 127-140 infra and accompanying text.
122. 40 C.F.R. § 2.306(h) (1980), incorporating by reference id § 2.209(f).
123. Id § 710.7(e)(2)(iv). To determine whether a manufacturer is bonafide, EPA
regulations require that the manufacturer submit various data and samples of the sub-
stance. Id § 710.7(g)(2). EPA compares these with data supplied by the original claim-
ant of confidentiality. Id § 710.7(g)(3)-(4). If the submitted information corresponds
with the original data to a significant degree, the manufacturer is relieved of the
premanufacture notice testing. Id § 710.7(g)(5). Otherwise, he must perform the tests.
Id § 710.7(g)(6).
124. See [1981] INT'L ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (Current Rep.) 673-74.
125. The agreement permits OSHA to obtain premanufacture notification submis-
sions, substantial risk notices, and other confidential information. Id
126. 40 C.F.R. § 2.306(h) (1980), incorporating by reference id § 2.202(d).
127. Directive art. 11(4).
128. "Sanction" is not defined in the Directive, but a reasonable person could con-
clude any action to require different packaging or labelling than that proposed would be
a sanction. Furthermore, any proceeding to elicit more information from the manufac-
turer, id art. 7(1), could be viewed as involving a sanction in the sense that it requires the
manufacturer to do something he otherwise would have no obligation to do.
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requirements effectively limit the risk of disclosure under the excep-
tion. Because of the market control requirement in the test, 129 most
proceedings will involve the manufacturer and a regulatory body. In
these cases, the possibility of damaging disclosure will be slight,
because both parties generally will already have access to the rele-
vant confidential data. 130 Consequently, an exporter might reason-
ably conclude that his data will not be exposed to potentially
damaging disclosure because of the proceedings exception to the
Directive's rule of confidentiality.
Unlike the Directive, TSCA broadly defines the proceedings
exception, thus exposing sensitive data to disclosure in a variety of
proceedings. TSCA provides that data "may be disclosed when rel-
evant in any proceeding under [TSCA], except that disclosure in
such a proceeding shall be made in such manner as to preserve confi-
dentiality to the extent practicable without impairing the proceed-
ing."13 Because Congress did not define "relevant," its meaning
depends upon the particular procedural setting of the proceeding.
Generally, the litigant seeking disclosure will easily meet the rele-
vance test and thereby obtain the desired information. 32
129. Id art. 11(4).
130. If the dispute is over revelation of data to the competent authority, the manufac-
turer will know that the authority's duty of secrecy will protect the data. Id art. 7(3).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 2613(a)(4) (1976). In its Conference Report on TSCA, Congress
stated: "[ilt is intended that the Administrator exercise due care to prevent the release of
confidential information to competitors of persons submitting data merely because the
competitors have joined the proceeding." LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 703.
132. If the proceeding is in federal court, a reasonable conclusion would be that the
Federal Rules of Evidence definition will control. Under those rules, "relevant" data
would be any information "tend[ing] to make the existence of any fact that is of conse-
quence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would
be without the [data]." FED. R. EVID. 401. Because the "more probable" standard is
easily met, disclosure by EPA will probably result in most proceedings.
Should the exporter find himself in an administrative proceeding involving EPA, the
regulations at least set forth the matter to which the data must be relevant. 40 C.F.R. §
2.306(i) (1980). In cases where EPA acts without a record or an opportunity for a hear-
ing, the standard is that the data must be relevant to the subject of the proceeding and the
public interest must be served by disclosure. Id. § 2.306(i)(2), incorporating by reference
id § 2.301(g)(2). When the decision is to be made on the record, the standard varies,
depending on who wants the information. When EPA desires to release data to the pub-
lic, the data must be relevant to a matter in controversy, a higher standard than "subject
of the proceeding," and the public interest must be served by disclosure. Id § 2.306(i)(3),
incorporating by reference id § 2.301(g)(3).
Finally, should a private party to the proceeding request the data, he must show signif-
icant impairment of the presentation of a significant matter in the case, as well as greater
benefit to the public than harm to the business from disclosure to obtain the data. Id
§ 2.306(i)(4), incorporating by reference id § 2.301(g)(4).
One result of these four standards is to prevent an exporter's competitors from receiv-
ing confidential data in some administrative actions because of the significant harm stan-
dard. Nevertheless, EPA can easily obtain disclosure in the administrative setting
because of the low standard of relevance. In federal court, anyone meeting the "more
probable" standard can probably gain access to the data. Consequently, a potential
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TSCA outlines numerous different types of proceedings, in
addition to rulemaking, in which relevant data may be revealed.1 33
The greatest threat of disclosure to the potential exporter probably
lies in the citizen's enforcement action, which permits any person to
commence an action to enforce TSCA or to compel the EPA Admin-
istrator to act.' 34 Thus, for example, in an environmental group's
action to force the administrator to regulate a chemical, the
exporter's confidential information may be revealed if relevant.135
Another provision allows any person to petition EPA to initiate pro-
ceedings under TSCA.136 Again, third parties attempting to force
the Administrator to act may gain access to sensitive data.
Another troubling aspect for the potential exporter stems from
TSCA's expressed goal of preserving the integrity of a proceeding
regardless of the potential harm from release of confidential infor-
mation. 137 If maintaining strict confidentiality will impair the pro-
ceeding, the data will be released. 38 An exporter may protect some
data by challenging its relevance but, once a tribunal finds data rele-
vant, it will preserve confidentiality only to the extent it does not
result in impairment of the proceeding. 139
Compared with the Directive's proceedings exception, the
TSCA provision is complex. Exporters to the EEC know their data
will be safe unless a proceeding arises that both involves sanctions
and is for the purpose of controlling substances in the market.
Exporters to the United States, however, must worry whether their
data will be found relevant in one of the enumerated types of pro-
ceedings.' 40 Moreover, exporters to the United States will be uncer-
exporter can reasonably conclude his data will be found relevant in most proceedings in
which the party requesting the data is not a competitor.
133. They are a criminal prosecution for unauthorized disclosure of data, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2613(d) (1976), an action for specific enforcement of TSCA, id § 2616(a), an action for
judicial review of rulemaking, id § 2616(a), a citizen's petition, id § 2620(a), and a pro-
ceeding to restore a wrongfully discharged employee, id § 2622(b). Also, EPA must dis-
close data if so ordered by a court. 40 C.F.R. § 2.306(h) (1980), incorporating by
reference § 2.209(d).
All of the proceedings pose a danger of disclosure of confidential data, but to varying
degrees. The criminal prosecution will involve data that has already lost its confidential-
ity because of unauthorized disclosure. In proving the case, however, the prosecutor may
need access to confidential data that was not revealed. The specific enforcement action,
the seizure, review of rulemaking, and the employee discharge action generally involve
the manufacturer and the government. Thus, most of the parties in these proceedings
will likely have access to the data independently of the proceedings.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (1976). See also 40 C.F.R. § 2.306(e)(2) (1980).
135. See note 132 supra.
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 2620(a) (1976).
137. See id § 2613(a)(4).
138. 40 C.F.R. § 2.306(i) (1980).
139. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
140. See notes 133-36 supra and accompanying text.
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tain as to the extent of disclosure, in view of the broad statutory
requirement that proceedings not be impaired because of secrecy
preservation.
E. CONFIDENTIALITY CLAIMS
Unless a person requests the release of information submitted
under TSCA, EPA cannot disclose any data.141 Once such a request
is made, however, EPA must determine whether the FOIA confiden-
tiality test has been satisfied.142 If so, EPA cannot disclose the data
to the requesting party.143 EPA regulations provide that EPA need
not make such determination, however, unless the manufacturer has
asserted a confidentiality claim at the time he submitted the data. '"
Rather, in such a case, EPA may disclose the data to the requesting
party regardless of whether the FOIA test would mandate confiden-
tiality. 145 In effect, a failure to make such a claim will deprive the
manufacturer of confidential treatment. To make a satisfactory con-
fidentiality claim under TSCA, the manufacturer must show that:
(1) the information will be protected by the business; 146 (2) the data
is not reasonably obtainable through use of legal means;147 (3) no
statute requires disclosure; 14 8 and, most importantly, (4) "disclosure
. . . is likely to cause substantial harm to the business' competitive
position." 4 9
The Directive's confidentiality test similarly requires the manu-
facturer to make a confidentiality claim before being entitled to con-
fidential treatment.' 50 The manufacturer must (1) regard the data as
commercially sensitive; (2) show that disclosure might result in com-
mercial harm; and (3) desire to keep the data secret.151 Clearly, the
Directive's requirement is easier to fulfill than that of TSCA. While
under TSCA the manufacturer must show that disclosure is likely to
cause substantial harm, it must only show that such disclosure might
cause harm under the Directive. "Might" connotes a lesser
141. The FOIA only permits disclosure of data to requesting parties. 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1976).
142. 40 C.F.R. §§ 2.204(b)-2.204(d) (1980). EPA may also make such a determination
if, absent a request, it desires to ascertain whether information is entitled to confidential
treatment, id § 2.204(a)(2), or if it believes that a request is likely to be made in the
future, id § 2.204(a)(3).
143. Id § 2.204(d)(I)(ii).
144. Id §§ 2.203(c), 2.204(c)(2)(i)(A).
145. Id § 2.204(c)(3).
146. Id §§ 2.204(d), 2.306(g), incorporating by reference id. § 2.208(b).
147. Id §§ 2.204(d), 2.306(g), incorporating by reference id. § 2.208(c).
148. Id §§ 2.204(d), 2.306(g), incorporating by reference id. § 2.208(d).
149. Id §§ 2.204, 2.306(g), incorporating by reference id. § 2.208(e).
150. See notes 69-73 supra and accompanying text.
151. Directive art. 11(1).
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probability than "likely." Furthermore, a showing of substantial
harm is clearly more demanding than a showing of mere harm. By
placing a heavier burden on the manufacturer, TSCA permits disclo-
sure in many cases where the Directive does not.
IV
ELIMINATING THE TRADE BARRIER THROUGH
REGIONAL OR UNILATERAL ACTION
The ideal solution to the trade barrier problem created by con-
flicting chemical regulation laws would require global cooperation.
Because of practical considerations and political differences, how-
ever, achievement of a global solution in the near future is improba-
ble.152 As an alternative, a regional approach to the problem offers
the most promise. Regional negotiations might not only eliminate
the EEC-U.S. chemical trade barrier, but might also permit elimina-
tion of duplicative data requirements and reduction of requirements
for non-essential data.' 53 The responsible U.S. and European
authorities, therefore, should consider the possibility of formulating
a regional agreement in the area of toxic substance regulation.154
In the absence of a regional diplomatic solution, the United
States could remove the trade barrier unilaterally, by simply defining
more precisely the data required by TSCA.155 The adoption of a
152. See CHEMICAL WEEK, April 25, 1979, at 46. A global approach would permit
meeting both goals of regulation and certainty. Trade barriers would cease to exist
because all companies would be subject to the same rules. Reduction of costs might also
result because each manufacturer would generate a single set of data instead of a differ-
ent set for each country of export.
Unfortunately, the impediments to global regulation are great. As evidenced by the
conflicts between TSCA and the Directive, different countries currently take different
approaches to regulation. Political difficulties prevent nations from solving even their
most pressing problems. Bringing the nations of the world together to negotiate a global
regulatory scheme, therefore, appears unlikely in the near future.
153. Reducing non-essential data sent to a regulatory body should also improve that
body's efficiency.
154. The industrial nations initiated regional measures to regulate toxic substances at
a recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Confer-
ence. The OECD Conference resulted in significant progress on testing guidelines,
updating mechanisms, good laboratory practices, premarketing data and acceptance of
data. The problem of confidentiality was referred to a Group of Experts for further
consideration. See Developments at OECD High Level Chemicals Group Meeting,
Paris, 19-21 May 1980 (on file at Cornell International Law Journal). Any proposals by
the Group of Experts will have to take the TSCA/Directive differences into account. See
[1979] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,179.
155. The EEC could contribute to the effort by specifying in the Directive the type of
notice a manufacturer will receive of an impending disclosure. Presently, the authority
to prescribe notice requirements is in the hands of the Member States. Consequently, the
manufacturer may face ten different notice provisions. Imposition of criminal penalties
by the EEC or the Member States for violation of the Directive's secrecy provisions
would have a beneficial deterrent effect. Finally, the EEC could expand the encoding
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base set data requirement would result in substantial improvement
over the present substance by substance approach. 56 Such a system
would permit the use of standard tests for all chemicals, with special
tests required only for especially hazardous substances. The system
would better afford the manufacturer an opportunity to foresee test-
ing costs.
Another appropriate unilateral measure would involve an
amendment to TSCA providing a more stringent standard for releas-
ing confidential data. 157 Such an amendment would not seriously
impair effective regulation, because the responsible agencies will
already have access to the data. Additional unilateral amendments
might provide for further limitations on the number of persons with
access to data, 58 and the imposition of criminal penalties for know-
hag receipt of confidential data. Unilateral steps of this type would
effectively eliminate the EEC-U.S. chemical trade barrier.
CONCLUSION
Effective regulation of chemical substances requires balancing
the needs of the public and the environment against the cost of such
regulation to government and industry. Regulation, however, may
also interfere with international trade. Sound policy decisions must
take into account these international effects.
TSCA and the Directive currently create a non-tariff barrier to
the international chemical trade. Global or regional solutions to the
problem may be desirable, but such solutions may not be possible at
the present time. Unilateral action by the United States, however,
through the use of amendments to, or regulations under TSCA,
might alleviate the trade barrier problem, without significant detri-
ment to the overall goals of regulation.
Charles A Wunsch
provision beyond non-dangerous substances. This would afford the manufacturer
greater protection, but would not diminish the regulatory function because the agency
knows whether a substance is dangerous or not.
156. Within the current TSCA framework, such a system could be imposed by issuing
a regulation providing that any TSCA testing rule will require certain specific tests.
157. See notes 37-44 supra and accompanying text.
158. The United States should also define the terms "relevant" and "impairing" in the
proceedings exception provisions discussed in note 132 supra and accompanying text.
These definitions would permit the manufacturer to predict with greater clarity the evi-
dentiary burden it will bear when challenging a pending release of data.
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